unrealistic speed of Camel
Posted 24 January 2012 - 17:45
40 pages in, you've convinced no one of anything, and yet you carry on with half-truths and glaring omissions, offering up your incomplete "analysis." It's impressive. Have you considered starting a religion? You've clearly got the right mentality for it. People might follow you. I mean, no one from this forum, .. but, .. people.
Posted 24 January 2012 - 21:03
Posted 24 January 2012 - 23:33
I don't have any of the reports on hand myself, but they are mentioned by NACA and in various books, with quotes from witnesses of the crashes etc etc. But if what NACA suggests is true, that the top wing generated 2.7 times the lift of the lower wings at high speed, then it sounds very plausible that this was part of the reason for the failures.
Do you have the report on the aileron failures due to excessive yaw ? From what I can gather the wing had a real likelihood of failing if the pilot applied too much aileron deflection at high speed, and I am beginning to think NACA may have been refering to the same thing.
Panthera have you looked at this thread ?
I had a look, interesting points brought up.
Posted 25 January 2012 - 03:13
The final conclusion:
"I would suggest that the Dr.I wing failures (and almost certainly those of the N28, too) occurred because lift-grading (particularly), together with aspect-ratio effects, caused the upper surface of the upper wing to be subject to much greater lift intensity than the rest of the system. This tested a leading-edge design of marginal strength, poorly made, to the point of collapse in particular aircraft. The leading edge failure continued back across the wing due to design details. Where rib tails, for example, were connected by a wire trailing edge, ballooning fabric will exert tensile loading in this wire which will then tend to "gather up" the rib tails and strip the wing. This would also destabilize the area of the aileron support structures, and so on. The strengthening of the wing aft of the spars and the improvements to build quality, carried out after the original failures, would have acted to prevent this catastrophic failure. But the root cause of the failure lift-grading went unappreciated until after the war when investigations like those at NACA were conducted."
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